• Lead Author: Priscilla Torres

• Co-Authors: Laura Huber, Roya Izadi, Cameron Mailhot, Mike Kriner, Lindsey Pruett, Sabrina Karim

Worldwide, individual police officers and military personnel engage in violence as a part of their mandate to maintain security. Sometimes this violence is unsanctioned and other times it is condoned, but unnecessarily escalates a situation. Starting from the premise that prior beliefs about violence can shape the actions of individual security personnel, we explore the strategic gendered conditions that shape individual security force personnel's beliefs about violence. We posit that female personnel must navigate a masculine work space, which means that they have strategic reasons to personally prefer deescalation, but tolerate misconduct committed by their peers. At the same time, we posit that prior beliefs about gender also shape personnel's preferences about violence, leading them to perceive violence and misconduct as strategically beneficial for them, and not believe that misconduct is particularly serious. We test our hypotheses using original survey data from 10 security forces worldwide, with an N=4,449, and find support for our hypotheses. The results demonstrate the importance of a gendered analysis of security force violence and misconduct, improving understanding of who within the security forces will engage in misconduct and escalation.

• Lead Authors: Mike Kriner and Cameron Mailhot

• Co-authors: Priscilla Torres, Roya Izadi, Laura Huber, Lindsey Pruett, and Sabrina Karim

For decades, the United Nations has established norms of civilian protection as a central dimension of their peace and security agenda, and centered UN peacekeeping around protection. Do these organizational norms about civilian protection diffuse to the individuals tasked with carrying out UN peacekeeping mandates? Here, we develop a theory to explain variation in adoption of ``negative" or ``positive" norms, by looking at the norm against sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) and the norm of civilian protection, respectively. We argue that negative norms are more likely to be adopted due to more consistent content and messaging. Positive norms are less likely to be adopted due to changes in the norm's content, which make them less clear. Using data from an original, novel survey of personnel from nine troop and police contributing countries (N= 4,430), we find that personnel who have participated in UN peace operations are more likely to report SEA, and to view it as a serious problem. However, previously deployed personnel do not develop a similar commitment to civilian protection. This demonstrates that not all UN protection norms diffuse in the same way, and suggests that individuals more readily adopt negative norms, like those against SEA.

• Lead Author: Zinab Attai

• Co-Authors: Emily Brooke Jackson, Angie Torres-Beltran, Taylor Vincent, and Sabrina Karim

This research note examines how climate change influences peacekeepers’ experiences and their ability to protect civilians. While peacekeeping missions have proven effective in reducing violence against civilians, we argue that climate change could limit peacekeepers’ ability to provide such protection. Drawing on over 200 interviews and 5,256 survey responses from UN mission personnel across ten troop and police contributing countries (TPCCs), we find that peacekeepers are already experiencing significant operational challenges due to extreme weather conditions such as rising temperatures, severe droughts, and water shortages. Peacekeepers note the detrimental effects on logistical operations, morale, and health, which ultimately hinder their ability to engage in protection activities. A quantitative replication of \cite{hultman_united_2013} further reveals that deviations in temperature and rainfall may mediate the effectiveness of troop numbers in reducing one-sided violence against civilians. Our findings suggest that as climate change intensifies, it could challenge the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations to provide protection to vulnerable populations in conflict zones.

• Lead Author: Lindsey Pruett

• Co-Authors: Roya Izadi, Mike Kriner, Cameron Mailhot, Priscilla Torres, Laura Huber, and Sabrina Karim

Why police and military officials enlist is of constant concern for organizations seeking to bridge gaps between civilians and the security forces. As we show, personnel are evenly split between ``extrinsic" (e.g. economic and material benefits) and ``intrinsic" motivations (e.g. service and patriotism) for enlisting, while a smaller number are driven by personal connections. The importance of these motivations goes well beyond practical information for eager recruiters. Existing research ties self-selection into security forces to more violent attitudes. However, there is less research tying motivations for recruitment to crucial outcomes within the study of professionalization and civil military relations. Here, we examine how motivations shape retention within security forces, and acceptance of civilian oversight. Drawing on cross-national surveys of security force personnel in nine countries, we demonstrate that individuals who are motivated to enlist for ``intrinsic reasons" are less supportive of civilian oversight. Simultaneously, these personnel are also more likely to consider changing careers. Personnel inspired by personal connections are also less supportive of civilian oversight. These results suggest that concerns over the quality of ``extrinsically" or economically motivated recruits may be misplaced, while efforts to recruit intrinsically motivated and well-connected recruits may yield detrimental results, for both security forces and for civilian institutions.

Gender training is mandatory for UN peacekeepers. Is this a box-checking exercise, or does gender training influence peacekeeper attitudes about sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA)? Existing literature maintains that professional training works to inform and socialize uniformed personnel, but we know little about the effects of training with respect to the UN zero tolerance policy that bans all forms of SEA. We argue that, in learning about the rules and norms that govern SEA, gender training influences individual attitudes by making personnel less tolerant of SEA misconduct. To make this argument, we draw on novel survey data of 5,615 military and police personnel from 11 countries and 14 security institutions. Three key patterns stand out: first, peacekeeping deployment increases opportunities for gender and SEA-related training by national security institutions, not just the UN; second, peacekeeping deployment increases security personnel's likelihood of having received gender and SEA-related training; and third, SEA training, particularly pre-deployment, significantly enhances personnel's knowledge about SEA, their belief in SEA as serious misconduct, and their willingness to report observed misconduct. We also find some evidence of compliance gaps, and discuss the implications and recommendations that follow. This research has important implications for our understanding of the effectiveness of gender training, as a means of peacekeeper preparedness, on personnel tolerance of SEA misconduct both domestically and while deployed on a peace operation.

Author: Dr. Roya Izadi

Published: November 17, 2025, International Studies Quarterly

From producing consumer goods to managing clubs, banks, and other for-profit firms, many militaries generate revenues that are not part of the military budget and are far removed from the realm of military affairs, and have adverse consequences for societies. Despite their significance, causes and consequences of such activities are largely unexplored. This article investigates the impact of military economic activities on propensity for coups. It argues that as the military expands its role in the economy, it gains both the incentives and opportunities to stage coups. However, this effect varies by rank. Military-run enterprises function as a double-edged sword: while they provide rent-seeking opportunities that reduce the likelihood of rebellion among mid- and low-ranking officers, they also embolden senior officers, for whom economic control becomes a political stake. Leaders may use economic privileges to co-opt mid and lower ranking officers, but as military builds more economic capital, senior officers become less dependent on civilian leadership and more likely to stage coups. Using an original dataset of over 2,800 economic enterprises owned/run by militaries for all countries from 1950 to 2020, I show that coup risk significantly increases as military economic involvement increases, and such coups are primarily led by senior officers.

Authors: Drs. Roya Izadi and Lindsey Pruett

Published: October 9, 2025 Sage Journals

Military involvement in the economy is a crucial aspect of civil–military relations. However, the impacts of economic ventures on the rank-and-file have not been examined empirically. In this article, we demonstrate that military economic involvement decreases the risk of mutinies by providing private goods that promote rent-seeking behavior among lower-ranking soldiers. Through military-owned enterprises, soldiers access jobs, benefits and off-book revenues (tax breaks, subsidies, favorable contracts, etc.) that are unavailable to civilians. Further, military elites may use these resources to subsidize military budgets and ameliorate economic grievances in the lower ranks. Using novel, cross-national data on military involvement in the economy and information on about 2500 military-run firms, we show that militaries with a greater stake in the economy are less likely to experience mutinies than countries with no and lower rates of economic involvement. Similar patterns hold for risk of mass defection.

Authors: Drs. Cameron Mailhot and Sabrina Karim

Published: September 5, 2025, Cambridge University Press

While often described as a unified process imposed by external actors on weak, conflict-ridden countries, international state building increasingly comprises a variety of actors involved in different ways in (re)building a diverse set of institutions. Civilian preferences are often excluded from this fragmented environment. We identify and explicate three dimensions along which postconflict state building meaningfully varies: the actor involved, the type of institution targeted, and the form of involvement. We then examine how variation along each dimension impacts civilians’ state-building preferences with two rounds of original survey experiments fielded in Liberia. We find that Liberians largely prefer state-building processes overseen by a subset of international actors; that they prefer state building focused on security-oriented institutions over non-security-oriented institutions; and that different forms of involvement in the process meaningfully influence their preferences. We also find that these preferences depend on civilians’ characteristics. Ultimately, we provide an initial, conceptual mapping of the diversified landscape of international state building, as well as an empirical “unpacking” of the conditions that may shape civilians’ preferences toward the process.

• Author: Laura Huber

Published: December 30th, 2024, Foreign Policy Analysis

A belief that women's representation increases legitimacy informs United Nations peacekeeping policies and the foreign policy agendas of many states. However, we do not know how women's participation alters support for UN peacekeeping within troop contributing countries. Based on gender stereotypes, the public may assume that women peacekeepers indicate that peacekeeping missions are more legitimate, which may increase support. Yet, if women peacekeepers are harmed, this may decrease support due to the gendered protection norm. Moreover, exposure to women peacekeepers may challenge gender roles. Using survey experiments in India and South Africa, this study finds that women peacekeepers’ deployment or death does not impact support for peacekeeping. However, exposure to women's casualties increases support for women's rights to some extent. Further, a survey of representatives of the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations reveals gaps between decision-makers’ beliefs about how women peacekeepers impact public support and the experimental findings.

• Authors: Angie Torres-Beltran and Cameron Mailhot

Published: July 2nd, 2024, International Studies Quarterly

What effect does sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) reporting by the United Nations (UN) have on the actions of peacekeeping missions’ troop and police contributing countries (TPCCs)? While past scholarship has studied the effect of naming and shaming for states’ human rights records, we examine the relationship between the UN’s reporting on human rights abuses committed by its Member States’ personnel and their policy and personnel responses. Focusing on SEA reporting within peacekeeping missions, we theorize the ways in which the UN’s reporting of SEA may lead to two distinct responses: TPCCs may issue legal frameworks to demonstrate compliance and address SEA, or they may withdraw from peacekeeping missions by reducing their personnel commitments. Using an original, cross-national dataset of UN reporting on SEA allegations and the patterns of framework issuance and personnel commitments among TPCCs (2010–2020), we find that TPCCs with SEA reports are more likely to issue legal frameworks and to reduce personnel contributions than their nonreported counterparts, and that this relationship is particularly strong following the first instance of reporting. With targeted TPCCs demonstrating both greater policy compliance and personnel withdrawal, our findings highlight the dynamic impact that UN reporting for SEA can have on the actions of TPCCs.

• Lead Authors: Sumin Lee and Andrey Tomashevskiy

Published: April 12th, 2023, International Interaction

How does government oversight of the military affect the occurrence of wartime sexual violence? This paper highlights the role of civil-military relations and state capacity in the occurrence of sexual violence. Building on research that examines wartime sexual violence in the principal-agent framework, we propose a game-theoretic model in which the military deploys wartime sexual violence based on its expectation of government oversight. We describe an equilibrium where monitoring is an informative signal of the government’s capacity to carry out the punishment. The government monitors strategically and may choose to remain “strategically ignorant” of the military’s conduct. Since government oversight is an informative signal of punishment, the military abstains from wartime sexual violence when oversight is high. We examine the empirical implications of the model using data on sexual violence, military oversight, and state capacity and find support for the hypotheses generated by the model.

• Lead Authors: Elizabeth Brannon and Sumin Lee

Forthcoming at Security Studies

Why do some post-conflict governments adopt accountability for wartime sexual violence while others do not? In this paper, we focus on the incentives of rebel parties to adopt post-war accountability, focusing on how their wartime governance practices influence their post-war behavior. We argue that when in power, rebel parties are more likely than non-rebel parties to support post-war accountability for wartime sexual violence as it helps them restore their reputation and rebrand the party. This tendency will be more salient in rebel parties that had exercised wartime justice measures as rebel groups. However, we expect that culpability in wartime sexual violence will make them reluctant to prosecute for fear of highlighting their own crimes. Using datasets on rebel governance and sexual violence prosecutions in post-conflict African countries from 1998 to 2018, we find support for our theoretical expectations. Our findings speak to the myriad avenues through which rebel party governance and culpability influence post-conflict politics and transitional justice.